We characterize which scoring rules are Maskin-monotonic for each social choice problem as a function of the number of agents and the number of alternatives. We show that a scoring rule is Maskin-monotonic if and only if it satisfies a certain unanimity condition. Since scoring rules are neutral, Maskin-monotonicity turns out to be equivalent to Nash-implementability within the class of scoring rules. We propose a class of mechanisms such that each Nash-implementable scoring rule can be implemented via a mechanism in that class. Moreover, we investigate the class of generalized scoring rules and show that with a restriction on score vectors, our results for the standard case are still valid.
sequence. If for each voter we assign those numbers to the alternatives according to his preference ranking, the alternative(s) achieving the highest total score is (are) chosen. By changing the number sequence, we obtain other rules. These rules are called "scoring rules".
Here, we are interested in identifying those scoring rules that satisfy a certain property called Maskin-monotonicity. In implementation theory, Maskin-monotonicity is a central concept mainly because it is a necessary condition for Nash-implementability (Maskin 1977) . It requires the following. Consider a preference profile and an alternative chosen at this profile. Consider another preference profile such that the position of the chosen alternative relative to each of the other alternatives either improves or stays the same. Then that alternative should still be chosen at the second profile. Maskin-monotonicity is a necessary condition for Nash-implementability, but unfortunately many widely used rules are not Maskin-monotonic. In fact, when there are at least three alternatives, an onto and single-valued rule defined on the "full domain" of preference profiles is Maskin-monotonic if and only if it is dictatorial (Muller and Satterthwaite 1977) . Also for each of the two best-known scoring rules, namely plurality rule and Borda's rule, one can specify a number of alternatives and a number of voters such that these rules are not Maskin-monotonic. In fact, Erdem and Sanver (2005) shows that when there are three voters and three alternatives, no scoring rule is Maskin-monotonic. Here, we characterize the Maskin-monotonic scoring rules for each problem as a function of the number of alternatives and the number of voters. Moreover, we give the number of Maskin-monotonic rules as a function of the number of alternatives and the number of voters.
We first show that when the number of alternatives does not exceed the number of voters, no scoring rule is Maskin-monotonic. Given a score vector s, we define k * (s) as the smallest k satisfying s k > s k+1 . We show that the scoring rule associated with s is Maskin-monotonic if and only if k * (s) >
, where m is the number of alternatives and n is the number of voters (Theorem 1). Moreover, within the class of scoring rules, Maskin-monotonicity is equivalent to a certain condition, which requires an alternative to be chosen if and only if that alternative achieves the maximal possible score.
We also consider the Nash-implementability of scoring rules and propose a class of mechanisms such that each Nash-implementable scoring rule can be implemented via a mechanism in that class.
Finally, we study "generalized" scoring rules, where there are possibly different score vectors associated with voters. Here, by imposing the restriction that for each voter the scores assigned to his first-best choice and his second-best choice be equal, we obtain results similar to the ones we obtained for standard scoring rules.
Preliminaries
Let A = {a 1 , . . . , a m } be a set of alternatives and N = {1, . . . , n} a set of voters such that m, n ≥ 3, and (m, n) = (3, 4). Let L(A) be the set of linear orders 1 on A. A preference profile is an n-tuple of linear orders on For each a ∈ A and each R ∈ L(A) N , let σ (a, R i ) denote the rank of a in voter i's ordering, i.e. σ (a,
Let s ∈ S m . The scoring rule associated with s, F s , associates with each R ∈ L(A) N the set
Note that two different score vectors can be associated with the same scoring rule.
, and each R ∈ MT (R, a), we have a ∈ F(R ). Let M be the set of all Maskin-monotonic rules. 
Case 2 m < n. Let p ∈ Z + , q ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1}, and n = pm + q. Let R ∈ L(A) N be such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and each j ∈ {0, . .
Note that the orderings between R m and R pm+1 are obtained by replicating the first m orderings. When q = 0, i.e. when m divides n, by the same argument as in Case 1, F / ∈ M. Thus, suppose q > 0.
We omit the obvious proof.
. . , n − 1} top ranks a 2 , and voter n top ranks a 3 and second ranks a 2 . Let R ∈ L(A) N be obtained from R by only interchanging the positions of a 2 and a 3 in voter n's ordering. Note
. . , n − 2} top ranks a 2 , and voters n − 1 and n top rank a 3 and second rank a 2 . Let R ∈ L(A) N be obtained from R by only interchanging the positions of a 2 and a 3 in voters n − 1 and n's orderings. Note that a 1 ∈ F s (R) and R ∈ MT (R, a 1 ). N be obtained from R by only interchanging a 2 and a 3 in agent 2's and agent i's orderings. Now,
Proof Suppose not. Let R be the profile defined in Case 1 of Proposition 1. Let R ∈ L(A) N be such that for each i ∈ N , the highest-ranked n alternatives according to R i are the same as according to R, and for each k ∈ {n + 1, . . . , m}, and each Here, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a k ∈ F(R ). But note that there is k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} such that s k > s k+1 . Now, let R ∈ L(A) N be obtained from R by only interchanging a k and a k+1 in R 1 . Since n ≥ 3, there is t ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{k, k
For each s ∈ S m , let k * (s) ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1} be the smallest integer s such that
Theorem 1 Let s ∈ S m . The rule F s is Maskin-monotonic if and only if k
is the maximal number of alternatives whose rank is greater than k * for at least one voter. Since m > n(m − k * ), at each R ∈ L(A) N there is at least one alternative whose rank is less than k * for all voters. Moreover, since s 1 = s 2 = · · · = s k * , that alternative also achieves the highest possible score, namely ns 1 . But then, for each R ∈ L(A) N and each a ∈ F s (R), a achieves ns 1 , and for each R ∈ MT (R, a) , N be obtained from R by only moving a k to the top and a 1 to second position in the orderings of all voters except for voter i and moving a 1 to the top in the ordering of voter i. Note that
We have established F s (R) = ∅, which is not possible since the sets of alternatives and voters are finite, and there has to be an alternative that achieves the highest score.
Theorem 1 suggests that, if a scoring rule is Maskin-monotonic, then it chooses the alternatives achieving the maximal possible score and only these. Let s ∈ S m . The scoring rule F s ∈ S is unanimous if and only if for each
That is, F s chooses an alternative if and only if it achieves the maximal possible score.
Corollary 1 Let s ∈ S m . The rule F s is Maskin-monotonic if and only if F s is unanimous.
Proof Suppose that F s is unanimous. Let R ∈ L(A) N , a ∈ F s (R). Now, since F s is unanimous, a achieves the maximal possible score. Then, at each
is the maximal number of alternatives whose rank is greater than k * (s). Since m > n(m − k * (s)), then at each R ∈ L(A) N there is at least one alternative whose rank is less than k * (s) at each voters' ordering. Moreover, since s 1 = s 2 = · · · = s k * (s) , that alternative achieves the maximal possible score ns 1 . Thus, F s is unanimous.
As one would expect, not too many scoring rules are Maskin-monotonic. In fact when m ≤ n, no scoring rule is Maskin-monotonic. When n < m ≤ 2n, only one scoring rule is Maskin-monotonic. It is the "antiplurality rule", associated with the score vector (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0) . When 2n < m ≤ 3n, only two scoring rules are Maskin-monotonic. One of them is the rule associated with (1, 1, . . . , 1, 1, 0) , and the other is the rule associated with (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, 0) . In fact, if we define a k-plurality rule for k ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1} as the scoring rule associated with the score vector (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) 
Nash-implementation of scoring rules
A mechanism is an ordered pair G = (M, π) where M = i∈N M i is a nonempty strategy space and π : M → A an outcome function. A mechanism Nash-implements F ∈ F if and only if for each R ∈ L(A) N , the set of Nash-equilibrium outcomes of the game (G, R) coincides with
Since F s is neutral and there are at least three voters, F s is Nash-implementable if and only if it is Maskin-monotonic (Maskin 1977) . Consider the class of mechanisms {G(t)} t=1,...,m−1 with the following strategy space and outcome function. Each voter i announces a linear ordering of m − t + 1 alternatives, say R i , and a positive integer, say z i . If the same alternative is top-ranked in the orderings of all the voters, that alternative is chosen. If (n − 1) of the voters top rank the same alternative but some voter j ∈ N top ranks a different alternative, the [z j (mod m − t + 1)]'th best alternative in the ordering of voter j + 1 is chosen. If j = n, let j + 1 = 1. If there are at least three different top-ranked alternatives, the alternative that is top-ranked by the voter who announced the highest integer is choosen. (Ties are broken on behalf of the voter with the smallest index.)
Now, consider the following strategy profile. Each voter i ∈ N announces a linear ordering of m − k * + 1 alternatives, say R i , such that: a is top-ranked at R i ; and for each b ∈ A\{a}, b is included in R i if and only if σ (b,
First of all, since a is top-ranked by each voter, a is chosen at this strategy profile. Moreover, when the strategies of the other voters are fixed, by changing his strategy, each voter i can only ensure an alternative which has a rank greater than k * at R i to be chosen. However, alternative a's rank at R i is less than or equal to k * . So, this strategy profile is a Nash-equilibrium at which a is chosen. Now, let m ∈ M be such that m is a Nash-equilibrium of G(k * ) at R, and a = π(m). For each i ∈ N , let R i be the linear ordering of m − k * + 1 alternatives announced by voter i. First, suppose that for each i ∈ N , a is top-ranked in R i . Suppose that a / ∈ F s (R). Then, from Theorem 1, there is i ∈ N such that σ (a, R i ) > k * . Since each voter announces an ordering of m − k * + 1 alternatives, there is b ∈ A from among the alternatives announced by voter i +1 such that σ (b, R i ) < k * . By changing his top-ranked alternative in R i and by changing z i , voter i can ensure that b is chosen, which contradicts m being a Nash-equilibrium. Thus, a ∈ F s (R). Now, suppose that a is top-ranked in the orderings announced by each voter except voter j. Suppose that a / ∈ F s (R). Then, from Theorem 1, there is i ∈ N such that σ (a, R i ) > k * . If j = i, the previous reasoning directly applies. Suppose that j = i. Now, voter i can top rank his best alternative at R, and changing z i , and make his top alternative at R chosen, which contradicts m being a Nash-equilibrium. For the last case, suppose there is at least three different top-ranked alternatives, and a / ∈ F s (R). Again clearly, there is i ∈ N such that σ (a, R i ) > k * . By changing z i , voter i can ensure that his top alternative is chosen at R. This contradicts m being a Nash-equilibrium. Thus, π(N E(G[R] )) = F s (R), and G(k * ) Nash-implements F s .
Generalized scoring rules
So far, we have considered scoring rules for which the score vector is the same for each voter. Now, we will define "generalized scoring rules" induced by score vectors that may vary from voter to voter. As opposed to scoring rules that are anonymous, that is, treats voters symmetrically, generalized scoring rules allow us to favor some voters. We obtain results similar to the ones for standard scoring rules, by imposing a restriction on score vectors. The restriction is that, for each voter, the scores associated with his top-ranked and second-ranked alternatives in his score vector are equal.
Let s 1 , . . . , s n ∈ S m . A generalized score vector is a family of score vectors, S = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ R m×n . For each m, n ∈ N, let S (m,n) be the set of generalized score vectors. The generalized scoring rule associated with S ∈ S (m,n) , F S , is defined by setting for each R ∈ L(A) N , (m,n) 
Theorem 2 Let S ∈ S
Proof (⇐ ) (For notational simplicity, for each i ∈ N , we write k
is the maximal number of alternatives whose rank is greater than k * i for at least one voter i.
N there is at least one alternative whose rank is less than k * i for each i ∈ N . Moreover, that alternative also achieves the highest possible score, namely i∈N s i 1 . But then, for each R ∈ L(A) N and each a ∈ F S (R), a achieves i∈N s i 1 , and for each R ∈ MT (R, a), we have a ∈ F S (R ). Thus, F S ∈ M.
( ⇒) We prove the contrapositive statement. Suppose that i∈N (m − k * i ) > m. Note that there is a profile, say R ∈ L(A) N , such that for each alternative a ∈ A, there is i ∈ N such that σ (a, R i ) > k * i . Let a ∈ F S (R). Let j ∈ N be such that σ (a, R j ) > k * j . Let b be the alternative that is top-ranked at R j , i.e. σ (b, R j ) = 1. Let R ∈ L(A) N be obtained from R by moving a to top and b to second rank at each agents' ordering except for R j . Note that R ∈ MT (R, a). Yet a / ∈ F S (R ). Thus,
We can also modify the definition of a unanimous scoring rule. Let S ∈ S (m,n) . (m,n) To see that this fact is not special to dictatorial rules, one can also consider the generalized scoring rule induced by ( (2, 1, 0) , (1, 0, 0) , (2, 1, 0) ) which is Maskin-monotonic but is not a dictatorial rule while s i 1 = s i 2 for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Corollary 3 Let S ∈ S
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